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necessity have understood beforehand how the cause would be determined.
But we had never expected one who- sat upon the woolsack in
the House of Lords to propose so. elementary an analysis of the
law, nor so perfect an elimination of all its disturbing elements.
If, indeed, the thing were practicable to the degree proposed by his
Loydship, we should arrive at that degree of certainty in the laN
where it might involve a question of casuistry not easy of determination, whether any well-informed counsellor could ever thereafter
appear to advocate more than the right side of any cause, which he
must be supposed to understand with- perfect infallibility. If there
was any danger of his Lordship's success in his own modest purpose.
we should not be much surprised at hearing & loud remonstrance
from the profession, not overmuch worked at present.
But we suspect that the world will go on much as it has done for
the last two hundred years, and decisions will continue to accumulate, and uncertainties still remain, and'more continue to be caused
than cured by legislative digests of the unwritten law of the land.
We feel very sure that no written law ever cured one uncertainty
without producing from two to ten in its place. All we can say to
men who think as Lord WESTBURY does, let them try it. This will
I. F. R:
cure them. Nothing else can.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
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Where a mortgage is given to secure future advances or liabilities, and the mortga
gee has definitely agreed to make such advances or to assume such liabilities,
the mortgage when recorded is a valid and fixed security, not affected by a suvsequent mortgage of the same property, though the advances may be made or the

liabilities assumed after the record of such later mortgage.
Where, however, it is optional with the mortgagee to make the advances or not.
and he has actual notice of a later mortgage upon the same property for an ex-

isting debt or liability, such later mortgage will take 'precedence of the prior
one as to all advances made after notice of such later mortgage.
Whether the record of the later mortgage would not be sufficient notice to the prior
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mortgagee; and whether a mortgage to secure future advances, to be made or
not at the option of the mortgagee, should not stand in all respects as if it was
executed at the time the advances are in fact made: Quere.
And it makes no difference that such later mortgage is given to secure future ad.
vances to be made or not at the option of the mortgagee, so long as the advances
under it are actually made before the advances under the prior mortgage over
which they claim precedence. [BuTLnE, J., dissenting.]
A knowledge of the existence of the later mortgage is enough to affect the prior
mortgagee, as to his future advances, even though he be not notified of the advances actually made under the later mortgage.
In a suit for a foreclosure brought by the prior mortgagee, against the mortgagor
and subsequentmortgagees, the bill alleged that the petitioner indorsed a note
of a certain date and amount for the mortgagor, under the mortgage, but con-.
tained no allegation that the note was a refiewal of a former one. Held, that
evidence to prove the note to have been given in renewal of a former note was
inadmissible.
Where a mortgage has been given to indemnify an accommodation iudorser of a
note, and the note at maturity is not paid, but renewed, with a renewal of the
indorsement, the security applies to the renewal note in the same manner as to
the original one. So long as the renewal note is not paid the indorser is not
indemnified for his original indorsement.

Bill for a foreclosure. The case was referred to a committee,
by whom the'following facts were found.
The mortgage -f the petitioner was executed on the 24th day
of August, 1855, by George Goodwin and others, constituting the
firm of Goodwin & Co., and was given to secure the following
bond of that date, executed by them:,, Know all men by these presents, that we, George Goodwin,
of East Hartford, and Charles Goodwin, Henry Goodwin, and
Edward Goodwin, of Hartford, all of the county of Hartford, are
held and firmly bound unto Charles Boswell, of said Hartford, in
the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, to be paid to the said Boswell, his heirs, executors, or administrators; for which payment
we hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and administrators,
firmly by these presents. The condition of which obligation is
such, that whereas the said Charles Boswell has agreed, from time
to time as circumstances may require, to indorse the notes of Goodwin & Co., and notes held by them, dhould they desire it, to an
amount not exceeding at any one time, outstanding, the sum of six
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thousand dollars, and only during the pleasure of said Boswell;
now if said Goodwin & Co. pay or cause to be paid all such notes
so indorsed or to be indorsed by said Boswell, and save him harmless therefrom, then this bond to be void, otherwise to continue in
full force. In witness whereof, &c."
The mortgage was recorded the same day. In. pursuance of the
agreement mentioned in the bond, the petitioner from time to time
indorsed notes at the request and for the accommodation of Good.'in & Co., not exceeding the amount provided for in the bond, two
f which he was afterwards compelled to pay, viz :-one note for
J'700 at three months, dated and indorsed on the 6th of March,
1861, and one for $3000 at two months, dated and indorsed on
the 20th of March, 1861. The note for $2700 was the last of a
series of renewals of a note indorsed by the petitioner for Goodwin & Co. on the 8th day of January, 1858.
On the 23d of January, 1858. Goodwin & Co. executed and
delivered a mortgage of the same property to the respondents Seymour and Sage, partners under the name of Seymour & Co., to
secure the following bond, executed and delivered at the same
time:cc Know all men by these presents, that we, George Goodwin,
Charles Goodwin, Henry Goodwin, and Edward Goodwin, copartners in business under the name and firm of Goodwin & Co., are
held and firmly bound unto Melancthon L. Seymour and Warren
B. Sage, copartners under the name of Seymour & Co., in the
penal sum of twelve thousand dollars, to be paid to them, the said
obligees, their heirs, executors, and administrators, for which payment, to be well and truly made, we hereby bind ourselves, our
heirs, executors, and administrators, firmly by these presents.
The condition of which obligation is such, that whereas the said
Goodwin & Co., paper manufacturers, have heretofore sent and
expect hereafter to send paper to said Seymour & Co., commission
merchants, for sale, the said Seymour &Co. making advances from
time to time on invoices of paper received by them, and wheroas
it is understood between the parties that said Goodwin & Co. may
need, for a longer or shorter period, greater advances than the
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paper in the hands of said Seymour & Co. may secure and indemnify
them for, and said Seymour & Co. are willing to make said advances for said Goodwin & Co., provided that the said advances
are never to exceed ten thousand dollars over and above the
property in their hands at the time, nor to be made but within five
years from the date hereof, and said sums and times to be at the
option of said Seymour & Co. Now if we pay to said Seymour &
Co. all such amounts as they may advance to us by note or otherwise, and save them harmless from all loss or damage by reason
of such advances, then this obligation to be void, otherwise to continue in force. In witness whereof, &o." I
This mortgage was made expressly subject to the mortgage to
the petitioner. It was recorded on the 27th of May, 1858.
Under this.bond and mortgage Seymour & Co. made advances
to Goodwin & Co. from time to time, the amount due to them, upon
which account, on the 20th day of March, 1861, was $25,312, no
part of which had since been paid.
On the 11th of February, 1859, Seymour & Co. loaned to Goodwin & Co. their notes to the amount of 85000, and on the same
day Goodwin & Co. executed to them as security therefor a mortgage of the same land embraced in the mortgages before described,
with certain other real estate not embraced therein, which mortgage
was recorded on the 15th of February, 1859. This mortgage was
also made subject to that of the petitioner, as to the land covered
by the latter. The notes so loaned were not paid at maturity by
Goodwin & Co., and Seymour & Co. were compelled to pay them.
-The petitioner had heard, prior to the 6th of March, 1861, that
Goodwin & Co. had made certatj mortgages to Seymour & Co.,
upon the same property which was mortgaged to him, but did not
know for what precise purpose; and did not know at that time that
Goodwin & Co. owed Seymour & Co., or that there had been any
advances by Seymour & Co. to Goodwin & Co. under the mortgage
af January 23, 1858, and did not know that Seymour & Co. had
paid any of the notes loaned by them to.Goodwin & Co. and secured by the mortgage of February 11, 1859. Seymour & Co. had
"The precise conditions of both mortgages are given in full in the opinion.
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never given the petitioner notice of either of the - iortgages,
otherwise than by placing them on record; nor iid they ever
request the petitioner to make no further advances to Goodwin &
Co. under his mortgage.
Upon the hearing before the committee the petitoner offered
'.vidence to prove that the note of $2700, indorsed by him on the
6th of farch, 1861, was given in renewa, . , fot mer note, and
was the last of a series of renewals of a note indorsed by him on
the 8th of January, 1858. To this evidence the counsel for the
respondents Seymour & Co. objected, but the committee received
it, and found the fact upon the evidence. The respondents
excepted.
The committee having returned their report- to the Superior
Court. the respondents Seymour & Co. remonstrated against its
acceptance on the ground of the erroneous admission of the above
evidence, and the Court reserved for the advice of this Court the
question as to the admissibility of the evidence, and as to what
decree should be passed upon the facts.

McFarland,for the petitioner.
1. The evidence was admissible. The fact was ,not important
except as affected by matter set up by the responaents in their
answer. They claimed a priority over the $2700 note by reason
of advances made prior to its indorsement. To show that they were
not entitled to this priority we offer evidence to show that ihe
not-, though of later date, is yet so connected with notes of =,
ezrlier date that the respondents are not entitled to the priority
which they claim. We could not have anticipated, and so have
adapted our allegations to, this claim of the respondents. The
Alegation of the time of the indorsement was no'. material. 1
Chitty Pl. 257. Renewal notes stand on the same ground as
original ones: Bolles vs. Chauncey,, 8 Conn. 889 ; Clark vs. Pond,
14 Id. 834; Smith vs. Prince,Id. 472.
2. Both the notes held by the petitioner are entitled to precedence, in taking the benefit of the security, over the mortgages of
Seymour & Co. The vetitbiner's mortgage was in all respects a
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valid one, and constituted a first lien upon the premises to the
amount of $6000. Crane vs. Deming, 7 Conn. 387. This mortgage was recorded, giving the respondents constructive, as they
also had actual, notice of it. Their mortgages were both made
expressly subject to this mortgage. In these circumstances the
petitioner had a right, as he had agreed to do, to go on and make
the indorsements contemplated by the mortgage and purporting to
be secured by it, and could not be affected by the mortgages of
Seymour & Co., which were not taken to secure a fixed indebtedness or an existing liability, but only to secure future advances
and liabilities, which were to be made and assumed or not at their
option. The petitioner had no notice that any advances had been
made or liabilities assumed by them under their mortgage, and
clearly could not be affected, if at all, without notice of such advances or liabilities. It is not enough that the petitioner knew of
their mortgages. He was not bound to infer from the fact of the
mortgages that advances had actually been made under them..
Clearly he was not, if Seymour & Co. were not bound to infer
from the petitioner's mortgage that he had actually made the
indorsements secured by it. They were bound to infer this, because the petitioner's mortgage was a prior one, to which their
mortgages were expressly made subject, while their mortgages,
later than the petitioner's in time, were also inferior to it in equity.
4 Kent Corn. 175; Hubbard vs. Savage, 8 Conn. 215; fetc)hum
vs. *Jauncey, 23 Id. 123; Rowan vs. Sharps' Rifle Manuf. Co..
29 Id. 282 ; Wilson vs. Russell, 13 Maryl. 494, 583; U. States vs,
ffooe, 8 Cranch 73; Shirras vs. Caig, 7 Id. 85; Evans vs. Bicknell, 6 Yez. 183; Wyatt vs. Barwell, 19 Id. 435; Gordon vs.
Graham, 7 Viner Ab. 52, E. § 8 ; 1 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 421, 422.
F. Fellowes and C. .E.-Fellowes, for the respondents.
1. The evidence that one of the notes was a renewal note was
clearly inadmissible, since the allegations of the bill lay no foundation for it. The plaintiff simply complains that he indorsed the
$2700 note in question subsequent to the mortgages and advancements of Seymour & Co., and has been obliged to pay the note.
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But this evidence, if admissible, could make no difference, since it
does not prove that there has been any forfeiture or breach of the
condition of the mortgage by reason of Goodwin & Co. failing to
pay any obligation, debt, or liability, which was in existence at
the time when the mortgages to Seymour & Co. became effective.
Every note with Boswell's indorsement which was then in existence has been paid at maturity, without the contingent liability
of Boswell by reason of his indorsement ever having become absolute. So far as it regards the present question, the renewal notes
are to be considered as so many independent notes which Mr.
Boswell was under no obligation to indorse, and 'which be was not
compelled to indorse to save him harmless from his prior indorsement.
2. The mortgages held by Seymour & Co. are entitled to priority
over the mortgage of the petitioner. The two notes set forth in
the bill and alleged to have been indorsed by the petitioner, the
-non-payment of which he claims was a breach of the condition of
the mortgage entitling him to foreclqsure, were made long subsequent to the execution and recording of the mortgages held by
Seymour & Co., and long subsequent to the advances made by
them upon the faith of their mortgages. In point of fact, therefore, Boswell stands to Seymour & Co. in the relation of a. subsequent incumbrancer, and thus, in point of law, Seymour & Co.
have the prior equity. That the mortgage to Boswell was executed prior to those of Seymour & Co. is of no importance, since
neither the note nor indorsements above referred to were in existence when Seymour & Co.'s mortgages were recorded and when
they made their advancements, and Boswell was under no obligaHe could make them
tion whatever to make those indorsements.
a
or not, at his pleasure. His mortgage was mere agreement that
if he should choose to indorse for the mortgagors thereafter, he
should have security under the mortgage-an agreement in no
manner affecting the mortgages to Seymour & Co. to secure advances made before the indorsements. To bold otherwise would
be, in effect, to tie up the estate forever, exclude the possibility of
subsequent mortgages or sale, and to protect it even from attach-
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ment, except subject to the contingency of Mr. Boswell's plbasurc
to put a prior lien upon it by a subsequent indorsement. Boswell
had notice of the mortgages to Seymour & Co., and made the indorsements with his eyes open. He had actual notice enough to
put him on inquiry. He also had, from the record, constructive
notice, which is equivalent to actual notice. Peters vs. Goodrih.
3 Conn. 150, 152; Stoughton vs. Pa8co, 5 Id. 447; Sigourney vs.
Munn, 7 Id. 324; Bolles vs. Chauncey, 8 Id. 390. The following authorities fully sustain our position with regard to the precedence of the mortgages of Seymour & Co. iSpader vs. Lawler,
17 Ohio 371 ; Frye vs. Bank of .lhsnois, 11 Ill. 367; Brinkerhoff
vs. Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch. 326; Craig vs. Tappin, 2 Sandf. Ch.
78; 4 Kent Com. 175, note c; Greenl. Cruise, tit. 15, Mortgage,
Ch. 5, sec. 2, note 1; Ter ifoven vs. Kerns, 2 Penn. S. R. 96;
S7 aw vs. Neale, 4 Jurist 695; Rolt vs. Ropkinson, 4 Jurist 919,
1119; 2 Redf. Story Eq. Jur., § 1023 a.
SANFORD, J.-The evidence objected to on the hearing before
the committee was inadmissible. The bill contained no allegation
of the fact which that evidence was introduced to prove; and the
respondents, having no notice of the claim, cannot be supposed to
-have come to the-trial prepared to meet it. For this error of the
committee in receiving improper evidence therefore, as the bill now
stands, the respondents, Seymour & Co., are entitled upon their
remonstrance to have the report of the committee set aside.
But as the petitioner's bill may be amended, so as to render the
.evidence objected to admissible, we deem it proper for us to ex-press our opinion upon the merits of the case as presented by the
report now before us.
It seems to be settled by a series of adjudications, that mortgages given to secure advancements to be made to the mortgagor or
liabilities to be assumed for him by the mortgagee in future, are to
be upheld and enforced against subsequent purchasers, mortgagees
and attaching creditors, even where the registration of deeds and
mortgages is required by law; Crane vs. Deming, 7 Conn. 387;
and although it is optional with the mortgagee whether he will
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make such advancements or assume sneh liabilities or not, provided they are made or assumed in good faith, and without notice
of the subsequent intervening incumbrance. McDaniel&vs. Calvin, 16 Verm. 300. Shirras vs. 0aig, 7 Cranch 84. STORY, J.,
in Conrd vs. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Peters 433. Truscott vs. King,
6 Barb. 346.
The petitioner's mortgage was given on the 24th of August,
1855, and was recorded the same day. The condition was of the
tenor following :-- Whereas the said Boswell has agreed, from
time to time, during his pleasure only, to indorse notes for Goodwin, & Co. as they may desire, but so that there shall not be outstanding ndorsepnents at one time exceeding six thousand dollars,
and whereas we have given him our joint bond of even date to
indemnify and save him harmless from all such indorsements; now
if we keep and fulfil the condition of said bond, and save him
harmless as aforesaid, then this deed shall be void, otherwise not."
On the 23d of January, 1858, Goodwin & Co. mortgaged the
same property to the xespondents Seymour and Sage, constituting
the firm of Seymour & Co. The condition of the mortgage recited
that the mortgagors had given their penal bond to the mortgagees
"in the sum of $12,000, providing that if the grantors shall pay
all sums that may be advanced to them under the Arm of Goodwin
& Co., by the grantees composing the firm of Seymour & jo., by
note or otherwise, which they are to do for the acconimodation of
said-Goodwin & Co., and save them harmless therefrom, then said
bond to be void. And said advances are at no time to exceed
410,000, nor to be made but within five years. Now if we keep
and fulfil the condition of said bond, then this deed to be void,
otherwise to remain in force." And on the 11th of February,
.L859, Goodwin & Co. gave to Seymour & Co. another mortgage of
the same, together with other property, the condition of which
mortgage recited that the said Seymour & Co. had loaned and advanced to them for their accommodation their promissory notes to
the amount of -five thousand dollars (specifying the date and
amount of each note, and when, where, and to whom payable), and
providing that if Goodwin & Co. should well and truly indemnify
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and save harmless Seymour & Go. from all loss, costs, damage and
harm, by reason of said notes, then the deed should be void,
otherwise it should remain in force.
Both of these mortgages to Seymour & Co. were recorded, the
first on the 27th of May, 1858, and the last on the 15th of February, 1859, and in both of them the petitioner's .mortgage was expressl mentioned.
In pursuance of the agreement between the petitioner and Goodwin & Co the petitioner from time to time indorsed the notes of
Goodwin & Co. for their accommodation, down to the 6th day of
March, 1861, and on that day indorsed the note for $2700P described in the bill, and on the 20th of March, 1861, the note for
$3000 described in: the bill. Both of these notes the petitioner
has been obliged to' pay. The note for $2700 was the last of a
series of renewals of a note indorsed by him on the 8th of January, 1858.
Upon this state of the facts the note for $2700 is entitled to precedence before any of the claims of Seymour & Co. under either of
their mortgages. The original note was made and indorsed by the
petitioner on the 8th of January,. 1858, 'fifteen days before the
earliest of the mortgages of Seymour & Co. was made, and several
months before it was recorded, and for that indorsement the petitioner has never yet been "9indemnified." And as his original
liability has thus been continued through all the successive renewals
of the paper, his original security also has continued, and. he has
now a right to resort to it for indemnity, as b e might have done if,
instead of renewing, he had been compelled to pay the original note
at its maturity. -Bolle8 vs. Ohauncey, 8 Conn. 389; Pond vs.
Olark, 14 Id. 834; Smith vs. Prince, Id. 472; Dunnam vs. Day,
15 Johns. 555.
Of the existence and terms of the petitioner's mortgage Seymour
& Co. were in legal presumption apprised by the record. And by
the law they were apprised of the protection which that mortgage
afforded the petitioner for all indorsements made before the mortgage to them was given, and the extent of that protection. They
knew, or at any rate they are chargeable with the knowledge, thai
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the original note was outstanding, and that the petitioner was liable
thereon as indorser when they took their mortgages. Or if they
did not know these facts, it was because they had omitted to make
such inquiries as men of ordinary prudence and sagacity usually
make under such circumstances, and intended to assume the risk ;
and in either event they ought to abide the consequences of their
presumption or neglect.
The $3000 note stands upon different ground. That was an
original note made and indorsed long after both of the mortgages
to Seymour & Co. were executed, and after advancements had been
made under the first of them, amounting to more than $215-00, and
under the second to more than $5000, both of which sums still remain unpaid. And it is found that the petitioner had notice in fact
that some intervening mortgages upon the property mortgaged to
him had been given by Goodwin & Co. to Seymour & Co. when this
indorsement was made.
The peculiar language of the report on this point has not escaped
our notice, but we think the fair import of it is as above expressed,
that the petitioner had notice in fact of these intervening mortgages
-ample notice of the existence of rights of some kind residing in
Seymour & Co., which it was his duty to respect, and which he had
no right to disregard. We deem it of no essential importance, as
affecting the rights of these parties, that the petitiQner did not
know for what "precise purpose" these mortgages had been made,
and did not know that Seymour & Co. had made any advancements
to Goodwin & Co. under the first, or paid any of the notes loaned
upon the security of the last. He did know that certain mortgages
had been made to Seymour & Co., and, consequently, that Seymour
& Co. had acquired some rights in the property mortgaged to him,
which rights further advancements or indorsements by him, if
allowed to take precedence of their claims, would necessarily affect
and might seriously impair. He was informed to whom these mortgages had been .given, and he knew that the town records would
disclose the true character and extent of the incumbrance created
by them, and clearly indicate the source from which exact and certain information could be obtained.
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"Whatever," says Mr. Justice STORY, -is sufficient to put a
party on inquiry (that is, whatever has reasonable certainty as to
time, place, circumstances, and persons), is in equity held to be good
notice to bind him." 2 Story Eq. Jur., § 400. Or, in the language of Mr. Sugden, "when a man has sufficient information to
lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conusant of it." 2 Sugden
Vend., ch. 23, sec. 1, p. 552.
The petitioner was under no obligation to indorse this note, and
in doing it with the knowledge which he had and without inquiry,
he disregarded the rights of Seymour & Co as well as the obvious
dictates of ordinary prudence and discretion. His mortgage was
indeed on record, but that record, though conclusive evidence of
notice to subsequent incumbrancers, was notice only that the petitioner had an inchoate. mortgage, of no binding force upon either
of the parties to it until some indorsements by the petitioner should
be made, and the only utility of which notice was, to indicate the
source of information and put subsequent incumbrancers on inquiry.
When one having actually made or undertaken to make advancements, or assumed or undertaken to assume liabilities for another,
has taken a mortgage in proper form for his indemnity, and placed
that mortgage upon record, his incumbrance is consummated, and
he may safely leave it to its fate. But when without some further
act to be done by him the instrument has and can have no effect,
and where it is optional with him to do such act or abstain from
doing it, why should he not be required, until he does that act, to
recognise and regard the intervening rights acquired by others, ana
b6 held chargeable with whatever notice of the state of the mortgagor's title the public records may disclose when the act is done ?
Why should not a mortgage to secure future advancements, to be
made or not at the option of the mortgagee, be treated in all respects as if it was executed when the contemplated advancements
are made in fact ?
But as upon this point there is understood to be some diversity
of opinion among the members of the Court, we prefer to place our
decisio -upon the ground already indicated, that the petitioner had
no ice in fact of Seymour & Co.'s incumbrance upon the property
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mortgaged to him when he indorsed the $3,000 note; and therefore
that his claim for that indorsement ought to be postponed to the
claims of Seymour & Co. to the amount of $10,000 and interest
thereon under their first mortgage, and to the full amount of the
notes loaned by them upon the security of their second mortgage.
We have expressed these opinions in view of the probable amendment of the plaintiff's bill, but our advice to the superior court must
of course be predicated upon the record as it stands, and therefore
must be that the report be set aside.
In this opinion HINMAN, 0. J., and
BUTLER, J., dissented.
The foregoing case involves questions
of great practical interest to the profession; and especially to business ihen
engaged extensively in large commercial, or banking transactions, where
advances are necessarily made from day
to day under such circumstances that it is
not always convenient to reach the
'registry, before determining whether to
make a new acceptance or not. For
this reason it seems extremely desirable
that the law sliould be settled, as far as
possible, upon some basis which shall
commend itself to the business instincts
of men, as well as to their sense of justice. It is a subject which, first and
last, we have had occasion to examine
very extensively, and in regard to which
it seems to us, there are some practical
difficulties, not entirely easy of satisfactory solution. See 2 Am. Law Reg. 1.
1. In regard to the first and second
propositions contained in the head notes
of the present case, there is now no
question whatever.
2. And the fifth proposition is equally
unquestionable also,-wherein the Court
adopts the general rule of equity law,
that notice of facts, sufficient to put the
.party on inquiry, and which if such inquiry had been pursued, in the ordi-

DUTTON,

J., concurred.

nary mode in which it is reasonable to
suppose prudent men, interested in the
question, would have been likely to pursue it, would have led the party to the
discovery of certain facts, is equivalent
to express notice of such facts. And
that it is not incumbent upon the party
interested in giving such notice, to interpose any formal protest against the
other party doing an act, which will
operate as a fraud upon his rights. But
on the other hand, it is the duty of all
parties to act honestly upon such knowledge, as they have, and to be reasonably
watchful not to do an act which may
with reasonable probability be expected
to operate to the injury of any other
party having a vested interest in the
same property.
In this last declaration the Court
have departed from the rule laid down
in McDaniels vs. Colvin, 16 Vt. R. 300,
where express notice of a subsequent
incumbrance is required in order to
stop further advances upon a mortgage
to secure future advances, and in addition to this, a formal protest against the
first mortgagee continuing to increase the
indebtedness under his mortgage. That
is a rule which exists nowhere except in
Vermont, and will, doubtless, be over-
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ruled there when the Court find a convenient case in which to change the
rule. The seventh proposition in the
principal case, is equally unquestionable.
3. The third and fourth propositions
seem to come more into the region of
debate. One very important inquiry naturally arising in all these cases is, in
regard to the effect of the registry of a
subsequent mortgage. We have never
been able to comprehend the hardship
of requiring the prior mortgagee, to secure future advances, to take notice of
the state of the registry, at the time he
actually makes hisadvance. The question has been so ruled in two of the States:
Spader vs. Lawler, 17 Ohio R. 371 ; Ter
Hoven vs. Kerns, 2 Barr 96; Parmentier
vs. Gillespie, 9 Barr 86. We apprehend
such a rulewill be likelyfinallyto prevail
in aei the .American States, either by
construction or legislation. Its innate
reasonableness andjustice, andgreatconvenience, recommend it so much to favor
that we believe the Courts will finally
feel compelled to adopt it, and, if they do
not, that the legislatures will interfere.
But, at present, the Courts in most of
the States adopt the English rule, where
no general registry exists, and require
notice to the first mortgagee, or what in
equity is equivalent, knowledge.of such
factsaswould put aprudent manupon inquiry in matters essentially affecting his
interest. This is avery just and reasonable rule, where there is no registry.
It is reasonable, too, where a party
has once acquired a vested interest in a
eecurity which is registered, not to require him to watch the registry. Accordingly the cases all hold, that if the
first mortgagee has become bound to
make the advances his security is perfect, and not liable to defeat or qualification by subsequent incumbrances.
And the case of Gordon vs. Graham,

2 Eq. Cases Ab. 598, pl. 16, S. C 7
Viner's Ab. 526, held that if the first
mortgagee has acquired the rfght to
make future advances, it could notbe defeated by any subsequent incumbrance
unless the party had, bon& fide, made
advances in ignorance of the prior mortgage, a case which could never occur
under the registry system, where the
first mortgage had been placed upon the
registry. But this case is now overruled in England, Hopkinson vs. Bolt, 7
Jur. N. S. 1212, May, 1861. And as it
never had any proper application in this
country under our registry system, it
has seemed probable to us, that the
Courts, after coming to the conclusion
that the mere right to make future advauces is liable to be defeated, by a subsequent mortgage to secure an existing
debt, will not feel- the necessity of requiring any other notice of the subsequent mortgage except the registry.
For if the first mortgage is treated as
merely inch oate, and as creating no
equity until the actual advance under
it, or the assuming of some responsibility under it, it is a virtual shadow or
form until after the advance is made.
And if it is treated as a valid incumbrance as to all advances made -before
the registry of a subsequent mortgage,
it is giving it all the force and effect,
which it seems to us reasonably to require. But the weight of authority is,
at present, in the opposite direction.
4. If we correctly understand the extent of the fourth proposition, and it is
intended to place two mortgagers of different dates, both to secure future advances, precisely upon an equality, and
to require each to make inquiry of the
other before making further advances,
it seems to us that the Court have, perhaps, carried their own rule beyond
its just limits. The knowledge of the
existence of mortgages subsequently
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made by the mortgagor, if those mortgages were upon the registry, ought not.
to affect the prior mortgagee, as it seems
tc us, beysnd the knowledge of the contents of the deed. He may fairly be
presumed to have gone to the registry
and learned the confents of the deeds.
The one which was given as security for
an actual liability assumed before the
execution of the deed will, of course,
bind the first mortgagee not to make
any further advances under his deed,
except as relying upon a lien subsequent to that created by the later mortgage to secure an existing obligation.
But as to the mortgage given merely
to secure future advances, it rather
seems to us he is not bound to regard
that as a present subsisting incumbrance
until he is either notified of advances

under it, or else knows of some fact
which obliges him, as a prudent man,
to make inquiries which would discover
the fact. And it seems to us, that
mere knowledge of such a deed will not
oblige the prior incumbrancer to keep
up an inquiry from time to time of his
junior incumbrance in regard to the
state of his accounts with their common
mortgagor. It seems to us this is placing
the two mortgages precisely upon an
equality and ignoring all priority of
right in the priority of lien. We think
the burden of watching the state of the
dealings may fairly be thrown upon the
junior incumbrancer. In this respect
we should incline to the view of Judge
BUTLER, who dissented from the opinion

of the Court.
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1. A State Legislature may constitutionally pass an act which provides that if it
shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Court that a defendant is in the actual
military service of the United States, any action against him in the Courts of
such State, shall stand continued during the period of his actual service.
2. Such an act does not conflict with the provision of a State Constitution requiring ",all laws of a general nature to have an uniform operation."
8. Nor does it infringe section 10, article 1, of the Federal Constitution, which
prohibits any State from passing laws to impair the obligation of contracts.
4. The prohibitory clause of the Federal Constitution discussed, and some of the
leading cases reviewed and commented upon by WRIGHT, J.

This action was commenced in October, 1862. Defendant, by his
attorney, made the proper showing that he was in the actual military service of the United States, and moved for a continuance.
Plaintiff resisted the motion, upon the ground that the statute
authorizing such continuances was unconstitutional, and also because
no plea or answer had been filed. He also moved for judgment for
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want of plea. This motion was overruled and the continuance
granted. Plaintiff appeals.
S. -E. Brown, for appellant.
. B. & E.

O'aussen, for appellee.

J.-We are satisfied that it was not necessary for the
defendnat to answer before obtaining the continuance. The statute
is: "That in all actions now pending or hereafter brought in any of
the Courts of this State, * ** it shall be a sitflicient cause for a
continuance, on motion of the defendant, his agent or attorney, if
it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Court ** * that the defendant is in the actual military service of the United States, or of
this State, and upon such showing being made, said action shall
stand continued during the actual service of said defendant in the
military service." Laws 1862, ch. 109, sec. 1. The theory of
the statute is, that such defendants are necessarily absent, engaged
in the seivice of the countrt, that while thus -situated they should
not be called upon to defend suits and actions brought against them
at home, and to compel them to plead or answer before asking a
continuance, would frequently defeat the very object and purpose
of the statute. We need do no more thau suggest that the advice
and assistance of*the party are frequently absolutely necessary to
the proper preparation of the pleadings, an& the law provides for
su.ch continuances as much on account of suc known necessity, as
to give him an opportunity of being present at -he final trial. T,
say that until he pleads it is not known that he, as a defence, and
that unless he has some defence, there is no necessity for a continuance, substantially begs the whole question. It is because,
among other things, he is not in a position to present this pleading,
that the law secures him the continuance. To hold that he shall
not have the benefit of a law because he fails to do that which the
law itself presumes him incapable of doing, would make the statute
inconsistent, and defeat the very object proposed by the legislature.
Is the statute unconstitutional, and if so, upon what .groundsI
To the suggestion that it conflicts with Sec. 6, Art 1, of our
WRIGHT,

WCORMICK -'s. RUSCH.

95

State Constitution, which provides that "All laws of a general
. ture shall have a uniform operation," we give but little weight.
The provision was not intended to cover or reach any such case.
In the first place, it may be doubted whether it is a law of a
"general nature" within the meaning of the Constitution. This
conceded, however, why is not its operation uniform ? It gives the
same rule to all persons placed in the same circumstances. It does
not prescribe one rule for one citizen or soldier, and another for
his neighbor, if they are in the same situation. We have a statute
regulating continuances on account of the absence of witnesses,
which gives a uniform rule to all litigants. And yet one may be
entitled to a continuance and another not. This results not because
a different rule is prescribed for each, but because one brings himself within its terms, and the other does not. So all persons in
the actual military service of the United States, or of this State,
can claim the benefit of the statute, and any one can have the same
benefit if in the service. Those that are not, are not entitled to
the same advantage, so to speak, because in the discretion and wisdom of the legislature it was deemed inexpedient. And yet this
advantage may be and is extended to all upon the same terms:
See Dal6y vs. Vof, 14 Iowa 228, and cases there cited.
But does this law impair the obligation of contracts, and is it
therefore in conflict with Sec. 10, Art. 1, of the Constitution of the
United States Y
The inquiry here presented has been most elaborately discussed
by the ablest legal minds of the nation, and is yet invested with
very great difficulty. This difficulty results not so much from any
ambiguity in the language used, as from a seeming effort to make
it mean more or less than was intended.
The language under consideration is: "No State shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts."
The pivotal words, as applied to the present case, are, "impairing," and "obligation ;" the latter being the most important. In
discussing this question we find the following among other definitions: Justice WASHINGTON in Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
918: "Tue obligation of a contract is the law which binds the
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parties to perform their agreement." Justice THOmPSON: "It is
the law which creates the obligation, and whenever, therefore, the
lex loci provides for the dissolution of the contract in any prescribed
mode, the parties are presumed to have acted subject to such contingency." Justice TRImBLE: "It may be fairly concluded that
the obligation of the contract consists in the power and efficacy of
,he law, which applies to and enforces performance of a conitract,
ar the payment of an equivalent for its non-performance. The
obligation does not inhere and subsist in the contract itself proprio
vigore, but in the law applicable to the contract. This is the sense,
I think, in which the Constitution uses the term obligatzon." Chief
Justice MARSHALL: " Obligation and remedy, then, are not identical. They originate at, and are derived from different sources. It
would seem to follow that the law might act upon the remedy without
acting on the obligatioh."
In Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, it is said that: " Whatever
belongs to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the
State, provided the alterationdoes not impair the obligation of the
contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it
is done by acting on the remedy, or directly- on the contract itself.
In either case it is prohibited by the Constitution." And in
Sturges vs. Urowvin8hield, 4 Wheat. 200, it is said: ."The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given
by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the
bar and exists in the nature of. things. Without impairing the
obligation of the contract,.the remedy may certainly be modified as
the wisdom of the nation shall direct."
Justice McLEAN in his dissenting opinion in Bronson vs. Znzie,
supra, says: "The idea that the remedy attaches itself to the contract so as to constitute a part of it, is too abstract for practical
operations; every contract is entered into with a supposed knowledge by the parties, that the law-making power may modify the
remedy. And this it may do, at its discretion, so far as it acts only
on the remedy."
Then in Gantley's Lessees vs. Ewing, 3 fHow. 70T, referring to
the case of Bronson vs. Kinzie, it is said to have been there held,
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that the right and a remedy substantially in accordance with the
right were equally parts of the contract secured by the laws of the
State where it was made, and that a change of the laws, imposing
conditions and restrictions on the mortgagee in the enforcement of
his right, and which affected its substance, impaired the obligation,
and could not prevail ; as an act directly prohibited could not be
done indirectly.
Says DENIO, J., in Morme vs. Gould, 11 N. Y. 286: "The most
obvious method by which a contract may be impaired by legislation, would be the alteration of some of its terms or provisions, so
that, assuming th6 validity of the law, the parties would be relieved'
from something which they had contracted to do, or would be
obliged to do something which the contract did not originally
require. * * It is admitted that a contract may be virtually impaired by a law which, without acting directly upon its terms,
destroys the remedy, or so embarrasses it that the rights of the
creditor under the legal remedies existing when the contract was
made, are substantially defeated. With this qualification the jurisdiction of the States over the legal proceedings of their Courts is
supreme." And after citing and quoting from a number of authorities, he says they "are exemplifications'of the principle that
legal remedies are in the fullest sense under the rightful control of
the legislatures of the several States, notwithstanding the provision
in the Federal Constitution, securing the inviolability of contracts ;
and that it is no valid objection on that subject that the substituted
remedy is less beneficial to the creditors than the one which obtained at the time the debt was contracted."
And it will be remembered that Chancellor KENT said in Holmes
vs. Lanning, 3 Johns. Cas. 75, that the provision in question was
not violated "so long as contracts were submitted, without legislative
interference, to the ordinary and regular course of justice, and the
existing remedies were preserved in substance and with integrity."
In his Commentaries, I, 455, 6, he refers to the remarks of
C. J. MARSHALL in Sturge8 vs. Crowninshield,supra, and says they
were general and latitudinary, "that to lessen or take away from
the extent and efficiency of the remedy to enforce the contract
VoL. XII.-7
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legally existing when the contract was made, impairs its value and
obligation." And says CowEN, J., in Butler vs. Palmer,1 Hill.
824: "Were the questions re8 nova we might feel great difficulty
in distinguishing between the obligation of the contract, and a
remedy given by the law to enforce it. It is difficult under the
notion that obligation and remedy are essential to each other, to
see how the latter can be impaired without producing the same
consequence to the other." "An unfortunate distinction," saysSEDGWICK, Stat. & Cons. Law 133, "has been drawn by the highest Federal tribunals, between the obligation of a contract and its
remedy. It has been repeatedly regretted that the State Courts
have adopted it, and it is now two late, perhaps, to hope for its
abandonment. What relates to the remedy is understood to be at
tlie mercy of legislation, but the obligation of contracts is covered
by mgis of the Federal charter."
We have quoted thus fully from some of the leading cases and
text books, to show the sweeping language used, that after all they
do not give us a practical line of demarkation in fixing the powers
of State Legislatures, and that in effect the whole subject is left open
to legislative discretion,when acting upon a matter solely affecting the
remedy, subject to the opinion of the Courts whether "the existing
remedies were preserved in substance and with integrity," or as another case expresses it, whether the "remedy is destroyed or so
embarrassed that the rights of the creditor under the legal remedies
existing when the contract was made, are substantially defeated."
11 N. Y. 286. And they also show (with due deference let it be
sa&id) "trials of logical skill," and in some instances "visionary
speculation" upon a subject which is addressed, as Mr. STORY
says "to the common sense of the people" and the Courts, and
which becomes involved in difficulty in the proportion that we
attempt to indulge "in metaphysical refinements."
Regrets have been indulged, that a distinction should have been*
drawn by the Federal and other Courts between the obligation of
a contract and the remedy given to enforce it. The writer of this
opinion may be permitted to express his regret that the distinction has not been more clearly kept up, and that anything was
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ever said confounding or connecting the one with the other. The
argument of Justice McLEAN in his dissenting opinion in the case
of Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, is in my opinion unanswerable, and gives a construction to the language of the Constitution
which is plain and intelligible, which any mind sophisticated or
unsophisticated (to use the language of Mr. Dallas) can understand. Every mind and every case to be found recognises a clear
distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy.
And to attempt to draw the dividing line, and say that the legislature may change some parts of remedial statutes and not othersor that some such changes affect the obligation, and are therefore
invalid, while others do not, and are therefore valid, leads to confusion; leaves courts and the public in a wide field of uncertainty,
without a reliable chart or compass; and necessarily involves the
decisions of the several states in inconsistency, each Court being
left to determine under the general and sweeping language of the
leading cases, whether existing remedies have by the newstatute
been preserved in substance and with integrity. It seems to me
that no one can refer to all the decisions made and reconcile
them.
We can all understand that the obligation meant by the Constitution is legal and not moral-that it arises under civil lawsthat it is the legally binding power of the contract, which renders
the person liable to coercion or punishment for its violation. But
is he to be coerced or punished under and by the law, according to the
provisions of the statute existing at the time the obligation was entered
into and in no other way? Or may the legislature,-not relieving
him from anything promised-nor imposing more than was originally required by the contract-change the remedy, without impairing the obligation ? And if this may be done, where is the line ?
where does legislative power-cease, and when may it be exercised ?
It is assumed that this may be done, for laws which do nothing
more than change the remedy, are not liable to constitutional
objection, and although the new remedy may be deemed less convenient than the old one, and may in some degree render the recovery of debts more tardy and difficult, it will not follow that the
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law is unconstitutional. But then, in altering the remedy, the
obligation of the contract must not be so impaired that the obligation and the rights of a party under it, may in effect be destroyed
by denying a remedy altogether; or may be seriously impaired by
burdening the proceedings with new conditions and restrictions, so
as to make the remedy hardly worth preserving. TANEY, 0. J.,
1 How. 315. Then, though the new statute may furnish a remedy
less convenient than the old, and render the recovery of debts
more tardy and difficult-yet, if the remedy is not destroyed or
so burdened with new conditions and restrictions as to make it
hardly worth pursuing, it does not violate the Constitution, and will
be upheld. And yet what language could leave the whole question in more doubt or uncertainty? It seems to me it would have
been vastly more satisfactory to have recognised broadly, clearly
and fully, a distinction between laws relating to the contract itself
and those relating to the remedy, and abandoned the effort to
occupy any middle ground, or if this distinction was not deemed
advisable, then adopt the principle of the New Jersey Constitution: "That .the legislature shall not deprive a party of iny'
remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract
was made." Either rule to my mind would have been much more
convenient, practical, and just, than that (if rule it can be called)
adopted, and while I deem the reasoning of Justice McLEAn,
above referred to, more in accordance with the Constitution, the
rule which denies the right to interfere with any part of the
remedy, is vastly preferable to any middle ground. It has at least
the merit of practical certainty, and this to me as a judge, and I
think, to the public, is worth more than all effort to arrive at abstract theoretical perfection.
But for a moment let us refer to some of the cases and see
whether they bring us any nearer a certain, practical rule upon
this subject. As applied to existing contracts, it has been held
that appraisement laws are invalid: 2 How. 608. Also, that a
law giving twelve months to redeem after-a sale under a mortgage
was invalid, as applied to an instrument which contained a power to
the creditor to sell and make his debt: 1 Id. 311. But the Legisla.
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ture may pass a recording act by which an elder grantee may be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded within the limited
term, whether the deed is dated before or after the passage of the
act, thus rendering the prior deed fraudulent and void against a
subsequent purchaser: Jackson vs. Lamphire, 3 Pt. 280. And
so it is competent for the Legislature to abolish imprisonment for
debt, upon prior as well as future debts. This is well settled :
Mason vs. H'aile, 12 Wheat. 373; Gray vs. Monroe, 1 McLean
528; 4 Wheat. 200. In Michigan, a statute taking away the
right of a mortgagee to maintain ejectment before foreclosure,
was held unconstitutional as to prior mortgages: Mundy vs.
Monroe, I Mich. 68. But in Maine (10 Shepley 318) it is held
that a remedy for a party may be changed or wholly taken away
by the Legislature. In California, a law allowing a redemption of
property enacted after the contract was made, was held invalid as
applied to such contracts: 4 Cal. 128. And yet, in Alabama, 9
Ala. 718, a statute giving two years to redeem from sales on execution under prior mortgages, was sustained. So in Pd'nnsylvania,
an act prohibiting a sale of property, for less than two-thirds its
appraised value, except after the expirationof a year, was held constitutional as to prior contracts (8 W. & S. 49). Acts for the limitation of suits at law, especially when a reasonable time is allowed
for commencing actions on existing demands, are not .regarded as
infringing upon the Constitution, 8 Mass. 429, and see a very
strong case upon this subject in 9 How. 527 (State Bank vs.
.Dalton). In New York it has been held that where the law conferred an extraordinary remedy upon particular creditors, a statute
taking away such remedy, but leaving the ordinary means for the
collection of the debt in full force, is not, though operating upon
existing contracts, within the constitutional provision : Stocking vs.
Hfunt, 3 Denio 274. And a law exempting certain property from
execution, has been held to apply to prior debts: Morse vs. Gould,
11 N. Y. 281. In this State it has been held that laws granting
exemptions from execution, affect the remedy, and that the exemption of a homestead is as much a part of the remedy as the ex.
emption of a horse or other article of property: Helfenstein if
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Gore vs. Case, 3 Iowa 287. It is manifest, however, that Mr.
Sedgwick in his work on Statutory and Constitutional- Law, does
not regard cases of the latter character as in harmony with the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, esteeming
what is said on the subject in Bronson vs. Kinzie, as mere obiter,
(and see Forsyth vs. Mauey, R. M. Charlton 324): p. 658, 652.
But the case of Evans vs. Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218, goes quite
as far in holding that a statute was valid which so modified the
mechanics' lien law, as to give the purchaser no greater estate
than was held by the person in possession, while, by the former
law, it extended to the fee simple: And see Conkey vs. BHart, 4
Kern. 22. We have found no case which holds that laws giving
the right to a stay of execution upon certain terms, would be
invalid as applied to prior contracts, unless it be certain ones in
Kentucky, which seemr to be based upon the peculiar provisions
of the statute: Blair vs. Williams, 4 Litt. 34; Pool vs. Young,
7 Mon. 587, and other cases there cited.
Mr. Sedgwick says that it is within the power of the legislature to regulate the remedy and modes of proceeding in relation
to past as well as future proceedings, (and- hence, subject to the
general rules heretofore discussed, it is, undoubtedly, competent
to prescribe new rules of evidence and judicial procedure (p.. 659) ;
and to the same effect, see all the leading cases. The case of
Holloway vs. Sherman, 12 Iowa 282, sustains the Act of April 7,
1860, regulating the foreclosure of mortgages, and which enlarged
the time given to a defendant to answer under the previous law.
The former law entitled the plaintiff to a judgment at the term
next after service, while this extended the time for answering after
service for nine months. And, upon the question here involved,
see Bosier vs. Hale, 10 Id. 490; also, Van Benssalaervs. Snyder,

13 N. Y. 299.
The length of this opinion forbids that we should examine,
critically, these several cases and their bearing upon the proposition now under discussion. But with what consistency it can be
maintained that a law abolishing imprisonment for debt, or one exempting, it may je, a thousand or ten thousand dollars of the
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debtor's property, is valid; and that one providing that his property
shall not be sold except under an appraisement, is invalid, we confess our inability to understand. If the one relates purely to the
remedy the other does. If one does not, neither does the other,
except upon a theory which has its foundation in cc visionary
speculations" or "metaphysical refinements"-speculation and
refinements not warranted by the plain language of the Constitution. The object upon which the remedy is to attach, is substantially the same in both cases. In each case the right to the remedy
is complete-the remedy itself, viz.: action, judgment, and execution, is alike unimpaired-but in the one case the object is entirely
taken away, while in the other it is left, but has to be dealt with
or disposed of in a manner different from that prescribed in the
prior law.
But we cannot further follow the argument. It only remains to
apply what has been said to the case before us, and settle the
rights of these parties. The Legislature has said that a person in
the military service of the United States, or this State, shall be
entitled to a continuance in all actions then pending or afterwards
to be brought. It certainly relates to the remedy; and the question is, does it take away all remedy upon this and similar contracts, or impose upon it such new burdens and restrictions as
materially to impair its value and benefit. For if it does not,
then, according even to the majority of those cases which have
gone the furthest in connecting the remedy with the contract or
its obligation, the act will be upheld.
In legislation of this character, very much must necessarily be
left to the wisdom and discretion of the law-making power. And
while our power to hold an act of the Legislature unconstitutional
and void, is unhesitatingly admitted, and should always, in a
proper case, be fearlessly exercised, yet it is of the, most delicate
and responsible nature, and should not be resorted to unless the
case be clear, decisive, and unavoidable: Santo vs. The State, 2
Iowa 208, and the cases there cited. That such a case is before
us we cannot believe.
The Act of 1861, Oh. 7, which this amends, granted these
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continuances to those in the military service, if it appeared that
their presence was in any degree necessary for a full and fair defence of the suit. And it was said in Lucas vs. Casady et al., 12
Iowa 567, that we were disposed to give that act a liberal construction in view of its design and purpose. If such continuances
could properly be provided for and granted, if it appeared that
the presence of the suitor was in any degree necessary for a full
and fair defence, why may not the Legislature, in the exercise of a
wise discretion, determine that the presence of all persons thus
situated, is necessary, and, if they ask it, they shall be entitled to
a continuance of their suits?
But does this legislation do more than relate to the proceedings
of Court ? Suppose, in consequence of the public danger, and
the great and absorbing interest felt in the national welfare, the
Legislature had postponed tle terms of all courts for one or two
years, or even more? would any judicial tribunal have been justified in holding a term, in thenmean time, and passing upon the
rights of parties? If so, when, where, and by what authority
Or suppose it had been provided that in all actions upon promissory notes against these volunteers, their. signature should be
established by at least two competent witnesses, whereas, in ordinary cases, no proof of signature whatever was necessary, unless
the same was denied under oath? Aside from a possible objection that such a law did not have a uniform operation, and was,
therefore, invalid, no possible argument could have been made
against it for the right to prescribe new rules of evidence, s6 that
the validity of the proof on which the claim is founded, is not destroyed, is not denied in any of the authorities.
But this act only gives a new rule of judicial procedure, in that
it extends the time for pleading. The obligation of the contract
itself remains in all its integrity. The party is delayed in the
enforcement of his right, but all remedy isnot taken away. How
f'ar ihe value or benefit of the remedy may be impaired (and
especially materially) by what are termed the new burdens or restrictions imposed by the act, we cannot know in this or any other
particular case. Nor is this the true inquiry. At most, the
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proper inquiry is whether, as a rule, this law as applied to all
cases coming within its terms, so far affects the value and benefit
of the remedy to which parties were previously entitled as to impair the obligation of their contracts. And satisfied that the
Legislature has not so far exceeded its power in this respect as to
justify our interference, we shall sustain the law and affirin the
judgment of the Court below.
1. The great practical importance of
the questions so ably discussed in the
foregoing opinion have induced us, notwithstanding its length, to publish it
entire. We are indebted for it to the
courtesy of Mr. Withrow, the Iowa
State Reporter. It may not be improper
to remark that Mr. Justice WRIEnT, by
whom it was delivered, is deservedly
esteemed as one of the most acute and
enlightened jurists in the Northwest.
No lawyer who has had occasion critically to oamine the numerous judgments and multiplied discussions in the
Federal and State Courts upon the prohibitory clause against impairing the
obligation of contracts, but will agree
that many of the decisions are wholly
irreconcilable.
One class of cases asserts the broad
proposition that the obligation of a contract, legally considered, consists in the
remedy which the law gives to enforce
it, and as a necessary consequence the
remedy cannot be impaired without, at
the same time and to the same extent,
impairing the obligation. As examples
see Blair vs. Williams, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 84;
Id. 47; McKinney vs. Carroll, 5 Mon.
98.
This view is not the general one, and
would have the practical effect of impairing the right of the Legislature to
mike salutary and- necessary changes
ip legislation and in the public policy
of the State.
The opposite extreme is found in an-

other class of cases which as broadly
maintain that the " remedy for a party
may be changed, or wholly taken away
bythe Legislature without contravening
the Constitution of the United States."
As examples see Read vs. Frankford
Bank, 10 Shepl. 818; 6 Id. 1094; Woods
vs. Buie, 5 How. (Miss.) 285; Evans rs.
Montgomery, 4 W. & S. (Penna.) 218:
Iverson vs. Shorter, 9 Ala.- 713; Catlin
vs. Munger, 1 Texas 598; Fisher -vs.
I
1
Lackey; 6 Blackf. 373.
The Ifmiddle ground" (the soundness of which is, arguendo, called in
question, rather than denied in the case
under consideration) is that the remedy
may be modified bu not destroyed;
changed, but not in such a manner as
so to embarrass and clog the creditor, as
substantially ,to impair or defeat his
rights. This view, wliatever may be
said against it (and it is certainly open
to the objections which Mr. Justice
WRIGHT urges), is clearly supported by
the present weight of authority, both Federal and State. See Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200; Mason vs. Haile,
12 Id. 873; Morse vs. Goold. I Kern.
281 (opinion by DENIO, J.) ; Conkey vs.
Hart, 4 Id. 22 ; Chadwick vs. Moore. 8
Watts and Serg. 49. In the last case
.Chief Justice GInsoN, with the brevi;y
and force which characterize everything
that came from that great judge, showed
that this was the only ground -under
such a system of government as ours,
at all consistent with progress and im-
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provement in legislation. In Indiana
(Hunt vs. Gregg, 8 Blackf. 101), Iowa,
(Schaffer vs. Bolander, 4 G. Greene, 201 ;
Ed. 393 ; Rosier vs. Haile, A. D. 1860,
10 Iowa 470), and in the Western States
generally, Bronson vs. Kinie has been
followed, though its correctness has
sometimes been doubted. We do not
understand the case under review to be
placed upon the ground that no possible
interference with the remedy would infringe the Constitutional provision, but
the suggestion is made and enfoyced
that this would be the sounder, plainer
and better rule, if the question is to be
considered as remaining open.
And we must be permitted to observe,
in view of the uncertainty and doubt in
which the cases are involved, that there
is great force in the suggestion. It seems
almost impossible to use plainer language than that in which the constitutional inhibition is expressed. And when
we turn from this and behold the deep
obscurity with which it- has been darkened by the refinements and speculation
of Judges, we are tempted to exclaim:
Great is the mystery ofjudicia interpretation I But it is not our intention to enter upon the general subject, having
already given it all our available space.
We dismiss it with the remark that a
vigorous, logical, legal thinker could
render the profession no better service
tbhn to clear away the confusion which
has, quite unnecessarily, as we thinl,
been suffered to gather around the plain
provision of the Constitution.
H. The above decision has also a
practical value in view of the fact that
other States besides Iowa have passed
laws of a similar character.
Whether the decision is correct depends of course upon the time meaning
of the Constitution. If the Courts have
full power over the remedy, the validity
of the act is clear. But if "the middle

ground" is the correct one, while the
constitutionality of the statute is more
doubtful and question more delicate:
still it seems to us not difficult to sustain the law. The military exigencies
of the country are imperative. The
Legislature must be permitted to exercise some discretion, to have some regard to the general condition of the
country. The act does not deprive the
creditor of his right to sue. The provisional remedies by attachment, &c.,
remain in force. The time of pleading
and trial are postponed only, and for
but a limited time. The period of enlistment does not exceed three years.
The law applies to those only who are
in the actual military service, and only
while they remain in it. If the defendant had been drafted it would indeed be
hard to require him to prepare for and
go to trial in his absence, the more especially in Iowa as parties are entitled
to be examined as witnesses in their
own behalf and at their own instance,
and without regard to the presence or
absence of their adversary. And in determining the legal question, it can
make no difference whether the defendant voluntarily enlisted or was conscripted. Woods vs. Buie, 5 How. (Miss.)
285; Holloway vs. Sherman, 12, Iowa
288, in principle very strongly support
the above decision.
In Pennsylvania a very similar law
to that of Iowa has recently been declared constitutional. By an act of
1822 officers and privates of the organized militia were exempted from execution and other civil process while called
into actual service under a requisition
of the President, or orders of the Governor.
In 1861, a supplementary act was
passed in the following words: "No
civil process shall issue or be enforced
against any person mustered into the
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service of this State or bf the United
In Coxe vs. Martin,'(8 Wright, not yet
States, during the term for which he published,) the same Court decided that
shall be engaged in such service," &c., a scire facias upon a mortgage was
and suspending the running of the Stat- within the prohibition of the act.
utes of Limitation in such cases. The
Where, however, the parties to a con
Supreme Court of that State, in Breiten- tract expressly include in it the legal
bach vs. Bush (8Wright, not yet pub- remedy by which it is to be enforced,
lished,) affirmed the constitutionality the Legislature cannot pass any law to
of the latter act, Justice WOODWARD, change the remedial process agreed
in delivering the opinion of the Court, upon. The defendant having expressly
taking the ground that the exemption waived all stay of execution, an act
was an interference with the remedy giving a stay in all such cases wias held
only, which could not extend beyond unconstitutional as to such contract.
three years, that being the term of en- Billmeyer vs. Evans, 4 Wright (Penna.
listment of the appellant in the case, 824.
and saying that the Court" cannot proJ. F.D.
nounce it unreasonable."

Supreme Uourt of Pennsylvania.
SMITH ET AL. VS. LATHROP ET AL.
Except in matters ruled by the clause of the Federal Constitution declaring that
"full faith and credit" shall be given in each State to judicial proceedings in
every other State, the Courts of the several States are foreign Courts as to each
other.
Therefore the plea of Us _endez in another State is no defence to a suit at the
same time and for the same cause of action in Pennsylvania.

Opinion of the Court by
READ, J.-The question in this case arises upon an affidavit of
defence, alleging the pendency of a prior action by the same
plaintiff against the same defendants for the same cause of action
in the city of New York, in the State of New York, and which is
still undetermined. It is proper that such a question should be
definitively settled.
In England it may be pleaded that there is another action depending for the same trespass, or other cause of action in the same or
any other Superior Court at Westminster. But it was decided by
the Privy Council in 1792, in Bayley vs. Edwards, 8 Swanston
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703, by Lord CAMDEN, and the Master of the Rolls, Sir RICHARD
PEPPER ARDEN, afterwards Lord ALVANLEY, that a suit pending
in England is not a good plea to the jurisdiction to a subsequent
suit in Jamaica for the same cause of action. Lord CAMDEN said:
"The plaintiffs in England attempt to set up the suit here in bar
of the jurisdiction of Jamaica, but the causes for allowing the plea
of double suits, are all where the suits are in Courts here, while this
is of a second suit in a Court which is a foreign Court, inasmuch as
this country has no process to enforce its decrees in the Islands."
"As to the inconvenience, considering the difficulties of administering justice between parties ocaasionally living under the separate
jurisdictions, I think the parties ought to be amenable to any
Court possible, where they are travelling from country to country,
and we must then endeavor to correct the mischief of these double
suits, as much as we can, by allowing in each country the benefit
of all the other proceedings in the other part of the King's
dominions."
In Coz vs. MitchelZ, 7 Com. Bench N. S. 55, it was held that
proceedings pending between the same parties for the same cause
of action in one of the Superior Courts of the United States, was
no ground for staying proceedings in an action in England.
EALE, C. J., said-: "No authority has been cited to support it,
although there may be some hardship in having proceedings pending in two countries at the same time. I think we are bound so to
enforce the laws as to enable the plaintiff to obtain satisfaction
of his debt. There would be great danger in interfering to prevent
a man from being sued in this country when he may have left his
own for the very purpose of avoiding the consequences of a suit
against him there."
WILLIAMS, J., said: " The question is, whether
the fact of the plaintiff having anoth& action pending against the
defendant in a foreign Court, is a bar of his remedy in the Courts
of this country. I am not aware of any principle upon which such
an argument could rest; and in the absence of any authority we
cannot interfere."
This case was recognised, to its fullest extent, by the Court of
Exchequer, on the 28th May last (1862), in Scott vs. Lord Seymour,
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the decision in which has been since affirmed in the Exchequer
Chamber. In this case the Court held that an action for an assault
and battery, committed at Naples, could be sustained in England,
notwithstanding the pendency of civil proceedings for the same
wrong in the Neapolitan Court. The Court said (81 L. J. Exch.
461) "Then it comes to this: that this is a wrong for which an
action would lie here, and for which (as it is not negatived) we
must assume an action will lie at Naples, but in respect of which
proceedings are pending at Naples, at the plaintiff's instance.
This, however, is no defence. It cannot be a defence in bar of the
action. It would be no answer even in abatement of the writ, that
an action was pending here in an inferior Court, and how in law
or reason can it be an answer that it is pending in a foreign Court,
when the action is in no sense local. The casQ of Coz vs. Mitchell,
is an authority to show that an action pending abroad, for a wrong,
is no ground for staying proceedings in an action here."
Now it is clear that foreign judgments are those which are
obtained in foreign Courts, and in this category the English Courts
have included the Courts of Scotland: Cowan vs. Braidwood, 1
Man. & Gr. 882 ; Ru8sell vs. Smith, 9 Mees. & W. 810 ; the Irish
Courts, Sheehy vs. Life A88. Co., 3 Com. B. N. S. Exch. Ch. 597;
the Colonial Courts of Jamaica, 3 Swanst. 703; of Newfoundland,
Henley vs. Soper, 8 Barn. & Cr. 16 ; of the Canadas, 5 H. Lords
Cases 431, and of New South Wales, Bank of Au8traiasia vs.
Nias, 16 Ad. & Ellis, N. S. 717, in which last case Lord CAMPBLL
says: "It has often been said, and by judges and judicial writers
of great eminence, that the judgment of a Colonial Court of the
British Empire comes within the category of a foreign judgment"
notwithstanding an appeal lies from them to the Queen in council.
There are not less than fifty of these colonial dependencies, all
of whose Courts, in the sense used by Lords CAMDEN and CAMPBELL, are foreign, and are so treated by the Courts at Westminster.
The same doctrine, in effect, was enunciated .by Judge WASHINGTON, in Buckner vs. Finley, 2 Peters 586. It was there decided
that bills of exchange drawn in one State of the Union, on persons living in another State, are to be treated as foreign bills, just
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as bills drawn in England, and payable in Scotland or Ireland, or
vice versa, were foreign bills (Aahoney vs. Ashlen, 2 Barn. &
Ad. 478, 22 E. C. L. R.), and so continued until the Mercantile Law
Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Viet., c. 97), by which bills drawn
in one part and payable in any other part of the British Islands,
are now inland bills, and for similar reasons to those growing out
of the difference of the laws and institutions of Scotland, England
and Ireland, although forming one United Kingdom, it is said by
Judge WASHINGTON, p. 590: "For all national purposes embraced
by the Federal Constitution, the States and citizens thereof, are
one, united under the same sovereign authority, and governed by
the same laws. In all other respects the States are necessarily
foreign and independent of each other." They are each governed
by their own. laws, and their Courts having no extra-territorial
power to enforce their decrees beyond their jurisdictional limits,
they are, in that sense, foreign to each other, which is the clear and
settled doctrine of the Common Law.
Then let us examine how this question stands upon authority in
the United States; and first as to New York, the pendency of a suit
in which is sei up as a defence to this suit. The mere pendency of
a suit in a foreign Court, or Court of the United States, or in the
Court of a sister State, by an uniform course of decision in New
York, cannot be pleaded in abatement or in bar to a proceeding. in
the Courts of that State: Boune vs. Joy, 9 Johns. 221 Walsa vs.
-Durkin,12 Id. 99; Mitchell vs. Bunch, 2 Paige 606; Cook vs.
Litchfield, 5 San'd. Sup.. Court 342; Williams vs. Ayraul, 31
Barbour 364. Such also is the rule in Kentucky, Salmon vs.
Wootten, 9 Dana 422, in which case it is said that Hart vs. Granger, 1 Connecticut 154, is not sustained by authority, which is
also the present opinion in Connecticut. In Melton vs. Love, 13
Illinois 494, and Goodale vs. Marshall,11 New Hampshire 99, the
same docrine is asserted. In White vs. Whitman, 1 Curtis 494,
Judge CURTIS says, after speaking of the New York cases in 9 and
12 Johnson: "These cases seem to me to have been correctly
decided. Though the Constitution and Laws of the United States
require that the judgments, rendered in one State, shall receive ful
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faith and credit in another; yet, in respect to all proceedings prior
to judgment, the Courts of the different States, acting under different sovereignties, must be considered as so far foreign to each
other, that a remedy sought by judicial proceedings under one cannot be treated as a-mere and simple repetition of a remedy sought
under another. There may be real advantages to be gained, in
respect of the property on which an execution may be levied, or
otherwise, by resorting to an action in another State, and the same
considerations are applicable to a second suit in a Circuit Court of
the United States while one is pending in a State Court ;" and the
same opinion is expressed by the same Judge in Lyman vs. Brown,
2 Curtis 559..
The most ample and learned discussion of the question is to be
found in Hatch vs. Spafford, 22 Connecticut 485, where all the
cases are reviewed, and the Court unarimously arrived at the same
conclusion. Opposed to these decisions is the case of ,Earl vs.
Baymond, 4 McLean 233. So far therefore upon reason and
authority, the rule seems to be settled, and the only remaining
question is, whether there is any authoritative decision of our own
I
Courts, leading to a contrary result.
In Toland vs. Tichenor, 3 Rawle 320, it turned upon the form
of the plea, which was held to be bad. In Lowry vs. Hall, 2 W. & S.
183, C. J. GrBsov said: "The pendqncy of a prior suit, in aforeign
country, cannot be pleaded in abatement of a suit for the same
cause here; and it has been held that the States of the American
Union stand in the relation of a foreign State as regards this particular matter." In irvine vs. Lumbermen's Bank, Id. 208, Justice
ROGERS makes a quaere upon the principle of comity, which is
clearly not applicable to New York; and in _alph vs. Brown, 3
W. & S. 899, C. J. GIBSON says: "Yet the substance of the plea
was palpably bad; not, perhaps, because the pendency of an action,
in another State, may not be pleaded in abatement of 'a subsequent
action for the same cause here, but for the reason that the bill ir
equity, pleaded-here, was not in fact for the same cause." Ae
none of these contradictory and uncertain dicta were necessary for
the decision in these cases, we are left untrammelled by authority,
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to decide the case before us on'what we consider the settled law of
the country, that the plea of s pendens in another State, is no
defence to this action.
Judgment affirmed.

Circuit Court of the United &ates for the District of Wisconsin.
EPHRAIM BUTTRIOK V8. JOHN' S. HARRIS AND ALBERT B. HARRIS.
Where a contract is simply for a loan of money, and the capital is to be returned
at all events, any profit made or loss imposed upon the borrower in addition to
the legal rate of interest, is usury, no matter what -form or .disguise it may
assume.
Where, however, an addition is i~ade for the price of exchange, not for the loan
or forbearance, but as compensation for accepting payment in a place less convenient, or *here money is less .valuable, the contract will be lawfuL
Therefore, a promissory note made and payable in the city of Milwankie, with
interest at the rate of twelvepr cent., and'exchange, on Bbston, not exceeding
one per cent., is on its face usurious under the laws of Wisconsin ;. and the mere
fact of the residence of the payee being in the State of Massachusetts, near
Boston, is not evidence that the exchange was added or the accommiodation of the'
maker.

Opinion of the'Court by
MILLER, District Judge.-Tke note in suit 'was giveti by defendants to the plaintiff, in the city of Milwaukie6, by which they pii'ilsd
to pay to the order of the plaintiff, two years after date, at the Marine
Bank, in said city, three thousand dollars, with interest at the rate'
ot twelve per cent. per annum, said'interest payable semi-annually,
with exchange on Boston on said principal and interest, not exceeding one per cent.
It appeared in evidence that the plaintiff resided in the State of"
Massachusetts, near Bston. That he had money loanied out an
Milwaukie, which on being lcollected' by his agents was borrowed
by the defendant, John S. Harris, and for which the note in suit
was given. There was no express proof that the note was made'
payable in Milwaukie with exchange, on Boston, corruptly, or for
usurious interest, or for the accommodation of the borrower, at his'
request.
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The law of the State of Wisconsin, under which the contract was
made, prohibited all corporations and persons from taking, directly
or indirectly, any greater sum for the loan or forbearance of money
than twelve per cent. And all notes or securities, whereby there is
reserved or secured a rate of interest exceeding twelve per cent.,
were declared to be valid and effectual to secure the repayment of
the actual sum loaned, without interest. The present law of the
State limits the rate of interest to seven per cent.
It- is well settled that upon a contract for the loan of money the
lender is not at liberty to stipulate even for a contingent benefit
beyond the legal rate of interest, if by the terms of the agreement
he has a right to the repayment of the money loaned, with the legal
interest thereon, at all events. 2 Parsons on Contracts 403, 405;
Cleveland vs. Loder, 7 Paige's Reports 557. A stipulation even for
a chance of advantage beyond legal interest, is illegal. Courts
will not lend their aid to enforce an unlawful contract.
A profit made or loss imposed on the necessities of the borrower,
whatever form, shape, or disguise it may assume, where the treaty
is for a loan, and the capital is to be returned at all events, has
always been adjudged to be so much profit taken upon a loan ; and
to be a violation of those laws which limit the lender to a specified rate of interest. It was conceded that exchange between Boston and Milwaukie was uniformly in favor of Boston.- Reserving
interest as discount is unlawful. Bank of U. S. vs. Owens, 2
Peters 527. A contract for the purchase of an annuity may be infected with usury. Lloyd vs. Scott, 4 Peters 205. And in a sale
of land, if the lender takes more than legal interest for the forbearance of the debt, it is usury. Hogg vs. Ruffner, 1 Black 115.
When a bank discounts a note with depreciated paper it is usury.
Gaithervs. !Iie .armers' and fechanics' Bank, 1 Peters 37. A
fair rate of exchange on foreign bills, according to current rates,
may be received ; but if more was intended to be taken, it is usury.
And if a charge for exchange is a cover for usury, the contract is
void. Andrews vs. Pond, 13 Peters 65-80.
It is not usury in a bank having the power by its charter to deal
in exchange, to charge the market raze of exchange upon timo
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bills. Buckingham vs. MeLeon, 13 Howard 153. The Court say:
" The reason why the addition of the current rate of exchange to
the legal rate of interest does not constitute usury is, that the
former is a just and lawful compensation for receiving payment at
a place where money is expected to be less valuable than at the
place where it was advanced and lent. The contract is not unlawful, unless more than six per cent. has been reserved or taken for
interest; if more has been reserved or taken, not for the loan or
forbearance, but for a change in the place of payment, then the
contract is lawful." In the case under consideration, the money
was in Milwaukie, where it was advanced, and where the plaintiff
agreed to receive it in the same funds, as to their par value, that he
advanced, with the highest rate of interest, and one per cent. added.
The note is not payable in Boston with exchange, but in Milwaukie.
In Stevens vs. Lincoln, 7 Metcalf 525, which was an action to
recover usurious interest paid, it was conceded that a note made in the
.State of Massachusetts, and payable in the same State, with interest
and exchange, was usurious. The exchange was considered a cover
for usurious interest. The maker of two promissory notes, in order
to obtain a renewal, gave a new note for the amount, paying the
interest due and the discount ; and in addition he transferred to
the holder, at par; drafts on New York and Albiny, worth- three.
fourths of one per cent. premium, to an amount equal to the debt.
It being a transaction within the State of New York, was held to be
usurious. Seneca County Bank vs. Schermerhorn, 1 Denio 133.
In ne Bank of the United States vs. Davis, 2 Hill 451, the same
principle is recognised. The bank having discounted a bill of exchange on New York, charged exchange in addition to the amount
allowed by law. In the case of The Oliver Lee Bank vs. Walbridge, 19 New York Rep. 184, the note was made in the city of
Buffalo, was discounted at a bank of that city, and was made payable in the city of New York, with the purpose in the parties to
enable the banker to realize a profit from a difference of exchange
between Buffalo and New York; a majority of the Court held that
there was no usury in the contract, for the reason that the law
recognised no difference in value in money within the State. But
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the evident inclination of the judges delivering opinions was, to
consider the contract usurious in principle. The Supreme Court
of the Statd of Indiana, in The State Bank vs. Enminger,7 Blackford 105, and in Mix vs. Insurance Company, 11 Indiana Rep.
117, adjudged notes similar to the note in this suit to be usurious.
Touslee vs. Durkee, 12 Wisconsin Rep. 480, establishes the principle in this State, that where the lender made a condition of a loan
within the State, that exchange on New York should be paid in
addition to lawful interest, the contract was usurious.
The law of the contract forbade the receiving or contracting for
a greater amount of interest than twelve per cent., directly or indirectly. If a larger amount of interest than twelve per cent. were
expressly reserved, the contract may be pronounced usurious without further inquiry; as it is for the court to construe a written instrument, which exhibitsan usurious contract. Bank vs. Waggoner,
9 Peters 378. Levy vs. (Jade8y, 3 Cranch 180. Walker vs. The
Bank, 8 Howard 62. It is equally the duty of the Court so to
construe a written instrument which exhibits an unlawful intent
to contract for usury indirectly. There is no proof in explanation
of the reason for making the note payable with exchange. Neither
party requested it. The note was thus drawn and signed. In the
absence of proof on the subject, the mere fact of the payee's residefice being near Boston will not'relieve him of the imputation of
indirectly contracting for a greater profit on the loan than the law
allowed; and that his case comes fully within the prohibition of the
statute. I think the note is usurious on its face, as a contract for
a greater sum for the loan of money than twelve per cent. • An
usurious interest is inferrable from the contract.
As the jury allowed interest in the verdict, a new trial will be
granted unless the plaintiff remits the excess over the principal of
the note.

